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For nearly 20 years the Irish State has engaged in a process of social concertation 
that has produced tri-annual agreements between the social partners and the 
government.  Beginning in 1987 as a response to economic crisis Irish ‘social 
partnership’ has received international attention because it has been closely 
associated with the spectacular success of the Irish economy.  This economic 
success, had by the end of the 1990s, produced virtually full employment and budget 
surpluses giving government the potential for policy choices that had not previously 
existed.  One of the major points of contention in this success story is the persistence 
of poverty and growing inequality (Layte et al 2000, Kirby 2004).  As a result of this, 
social partnership has been criticised for its failure to provide a policy forum able to 
address the problem of poverty.   
 
From its inception Social Partnership was a contested process, and both its 
contribution to Ireland’s economic success and its effectiveness as a policy forum 
have been questioned, especially its capacity to contribute to the development of 
policy to address poverty and social exclusion. On the other hand, it has also 
retained strong support from members of the leadership of the trade unions and 
employers organisations and the political parties. The government has continued to 
demonstrate a strong commitment to maintaining social partnership, linking it closely 
to continued economic success, in the words of the Taoiseach the ‘decision to initiate 
social partnership and its supporting process of engagement has had profound 
effects on the economic and social destiny of this country’ and that ‘is why I believe 
passionately that we should continue with the partnership process over the 
challenging period ahead’2.  From the beginning of the process, a national pay deal 
and macroeconomic policy were the most important aspects of social partnership, but 
these concerns were integrated with social policy.  As a result, during the early 1990s 
civil society organisations working in social policy areas made submissions to the 
partnership process and from 1997 the negotiations included a ‘social’ pillar 
composed of voluntary and community groups selected by government.  As a result, 
in the late 1990s social partnership provided a focus for groups campaigning on 
issues relating to poverty and inequality.  The lack of progress on these issues led 
many to conclude that in spite of the changing social and economic realities, 
government through social partnership continued to apply the policy solutions derived 
from the very different conditions of the late 1980s (Reynolds, 2005: 3-4).  This 
                                                
2 An Taoiseach Bertie Ahern speaking at the opening of National Economic and Social 
Development Office (NESDO), 24 February, 2003. 
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apparent adaptive failure on the part of a process that came to define itself as flexible 
and problem solving (NESC: 2003) seems anomalous and requires some 
explanation.  An issue related to this problem is the extent to which social partnership 
represented ‘real’ negotiations.  The argument has been made that the process, 
apart from the industrial relations elements, has increasingly become merely a 
restatement or repackaging of existing government policy, with the programmes for 
government and the government’s budgetary policy determining the content of the 
social partnership agreements. 
 
Given these debates and the central place that the social partnership process had in 
Irish public policy making, this paper analyses the way in which policy dealing with 
poverty and social exclusion has been institutionalised in the social partnership 
process.  To do this, it uses the concept of ideational change, which can explain the 
process by which policy institutions (such as ‘social partnership’) change over time 
and also how they are constructed by policy ideas.  This theoretical framework can 
also explain why policy institutions persist with a particular policy solution even when 
there have been significant changes in the environment in which that policy institution 
operates.  In the context of Irish Social Partnership it argues that the first social 
partnership agreement of 1987 was part of the institutionalisation of a new policy 
regime that marked a distinct break with the past, and most importantly that the 
parameters of the policies established in that first agreement and the ideas that 
underpinned them continue to shape Irish public policy into the 21st century.  
Following the negotiation of the 2003 agreement there was a perception by members 
of the voluntary and community pillar that Social Partnership had reached a 
watershed in both its policy content and method of negotiation.  This perception has 
been compounded by both the shift in language and timescale of the agreement 
reached in 2006 and raises the question do these changes represent a significant 
departure from the existing paradigm or a policy adjustment within a consistent policy 
framework provided by nearly two decades of partnership agreements. 
 
 
Ideas and the Institutionalisation of Policy Regimes 
 
Observing policy change over time, and across states, it is noticeable that in addition 
to ‘normal’ or incremental reform, policy institutions also go through periods of 
relatively brief, infrequent period of more fundamental change that reconstructs the 
policy regime of states.  Such episodes of reconstruction are not usually confined to 
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individual states but are part of a wider experience of policy change such as the shift 
to Keynesian economic policy amongst democratic states after the Second World 
War and the equally dramatic shift to neo-liberal economic policies globally during the 
1980s.   Wholesale changes in policy like this occur ‘relatively rarely’ because policy 
makers normally work within an implicit ‘framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing’ (Hall, 1993: 279).    So although ideational theory provides an insight into 
how policy institutions change, it can also explain continuity in policy making, that is, 
the way in which a firmly institutionalised set of policies provides a framework of 
ideas that continues to exert a strong influence on policy over time.   This happens 
because the framework of ideas that Hall calls a ‘policy paradigm’, is embedded in 
the ‘very terminology’ in which policy is discussed and because it is taken for granted 
to such a great extent it is not amenable to scrutiny in its totality (1993: 279) and 
therefore is not easily substantially changed.  In this way policy paradigms also 
specify the ‘hierarchy of goals’ that lie behind policy (Hall, 1993: 279); for example, in 
the case of Irish social partnership the goal of maintaining international 
competitiveness could be defined as a primary goal of policy, with social policy goals 
coming much lower in the hierarchal ordering of policy.   
 
In his discussion of policy paradigms Hall (1993) draws on Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) 
work on scientific paradigms and, following Kuhn, describes three different types of 
policy change.  First and second order policy change, are defined as change to the 
policy settings and change to the policy instruments respectively.  Changes of this 
type are ‘normal’ or incremental policymaking - that is a policy adjustment that does 
not challenge ‘the overall terms of a given policy paradigm’.  Third order change on 
the other hand is ‘marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy 
discourse associated with a paradigm shift’ and ‘associated with periodic 
discontinuities in policy’ (Hall, 1993; 279).  Hall suggests that within an existing policy 
regime first and second order policy changes arise from a process of social learning 
that is incremental in its nature, however the paradigm shift that marks a more 
fundamental policy regime change is ‘marked by a kind of punctuated equilibrium that 
often applies more generally to political change’ (1993: 277). He argues that 
economic policy in the UK displayed this type of trajectory as the ‘presence of a 
policy paradigm generated long periods of continuity punctuated occasionally by the 
disjunctive experience of paradigm shift’ (Hall, 1993: 291).  Hall using the example of 
the adoption of monetarist models of macro economic policy regulation associated 
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with the British Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher argued that this 
involved a simultaneous change in the three key components of policy; the setting of 
the policy instruments; the policy instruments themselves; and the hierarchy of the 
goals behind policy (1993: 279).    
 
Blyth (1997) describes this process as a fundamental shift in both the definition of the 
economic problem faced by the state and also a fundamental shift in the policies 
designed to deal with these new circumstances.  Ideological contest between political 
parties by itself cannot explain what Blyth (1997) has referred to as a redefinition of 
the ‘political middle’.  By this he means what the majority considered (as expressed 
through voter choices in elections and the mainstream media) as the political middle 
ground, or as ‘common sense’.  It is not merely that a group of a particular political 
ideology gain influence but that a large number of people change their views on the 
definition of the economic problems they face and the potential solutions to those 
problems.   
 
Both Hall and Blyth have described how a set of ‘new’3 ideas on policy are used to 
challenge an existing policy regime, and how after a period of dissent and political 
regrouping a new policy paradigm emerges that either creates new policy institutions 
or redefines existing ones.  In this way the re-institutionalising of a policy regime is a 
significant event and it would be expected that such a process would meet with 
institutional resistance as well as resistance from existing vested interests.  A change 
of this level requires a change in the ideas of individuals on a societal level or 
amongst significant groups; this implies that new ideas to become institutionalised 
need ‘co-ordinated and/or collective action to facilitate change’ (Legro, 2000: 424).  
On this basis Legro (2000: 424) suggests a model of ideational change involving two 
idealised stages.  The first stage involves the ‘collapse’ of the existing ‘consensus’ 
where significant actors are able to agree that ‘the old orthodoxy is inadequate and 
should be replaced’.  The second phase is the ‘consolidation of a new ideational 
structure’, which requires the existence of ‘a viable oppositional idea, the 
prescriptions of which correlate with socially desired results’ (Legro, 2000: 426).  The 
process by which a coherent ‘oppositional idea’ emerges is likely to be a complex 
political battle involving an array of alternative ideas, interest groupings and political 
                                                
3 In this case ‘new’ ideas means ideas that are being applied in a novel way rather than ideas 
that have not previously been known. For example, the ideas introduced by the Conservative 
Government under Thatcher were familiar to many as ideas derived from economic theory, 
their newness is the way in which they were used to underpin policy change replacing a very 
different form of economic analysis. 
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structures.  In the case of the adoption of neo liberal economic policy in the UK the 
policy changed ‘in response to an evolving societal debate that soon became bound 
up with electoral competition’ (Hall, 1993: 288).   In the 1979 British general election 
the two major political parties presented the electorate with two alternative models of 
economic policy at a time when there was a growing sense of economic crisis and a 
belief, expressed in public debate and in the media, that the previous sets of 
economic policies were not capable of addressing the crisis. 
 
In a similar way Blyth (2002) argues that institutional change is brought about 
through the response of political actors to times of uncertainty and crisis.  The use of 
‘ideas’ by political actors in such situations is crucial to the way in which the crisis is 
resolved, institutions are reformed, or established, and a new policy paradigm is 
created.  Blyth (2002: 254) identifies the key features of a crisis as uncertainly and 
doubt about the definition of what the crisis actually is, i.e. what is the cause rather 
than the symptoms of the problem and also uncertainty about what would constitute 
a successful policy response.  When a crisis does not have a clear and widely 
accepted solution, political actors are seeking a policy response and this creates the 
conditions in which political actors can adopt ‘new ideas’ and that provide both a 
definition of the perceived problems and a potential solution to it.  Such a period of 
uncertainty is also, therefore, likely to involve a high level of political contestation as 
different political groupings propose different policy solutions to the crisis.  The 
adoption of a particular policy solution by a group of political actors facilitates 
collective action around that solution and the building of coalitions to advance and 
institutionalise the proposed policy solution.  Following the institutionalisation of the 
set of new policy ideas, those ideas then provide a source of stability in policy making 
(Blyth, 2002).  They do this in two ways. Firstly they provide a hegemonic set of ideas 
on which to base policy that by definition can command widespread support.  This 
tends to be reinforced by international example, because such conditions of crisis 
and institutional restructuring are most frequently an international experience, with 
states undergoing similar processes of contestation and institution building at the 
same time.  Secondly the new set of policy ideas make stability possible as they 
allow policy makes to achieve a match between the definition of the problem and 
expected policy outcomes in a way that addresses the new conditions (Blyth, 2002).   
Once a policy paradigm has been ‘institutionally embedded’, the ideas it contains act 
as a ‘cognitive lock’ ensuring that ‘policy making becomes possible only in terms of 
these ideas’ (2001: 4).    
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Perspectives on Irish Social Partnership 
 
There is a consensus in the literature on social partnership that the first agreement in 
1987 did institute the beginning of a new departure in the institutional form of policy 
making and that policy was also based on a distinctive set of ideas.  This consensus 
exists even where authors disagree on other issues, such as, how embedded the 
process is and the degree to which government decisions are bound by the 
outcomes of social partnership negotiations.  In examining the extent to which the 
policy paradigm established within social partnership in the late 1980s still shapes 
government policy in the 21st century, the nature of the changes in governance (of 
which social partnership has been a key part) in that 20-year period has to be 
recognised.  The development of social partnership coincided with the international 
experience of the communications revolution and changed relationships between 
state and civil society.  Political representation in its traditional form has been 
modified by the growth in both campaigning and service delivery civil society groups 
that have a greatly enhanced capacity to communicate both with their own members 
and with government.  Such groups, as well as individual citizens no longer have the 
same reliance on the mediation of TDs.  Social Partnership in many ways embodies 
this new state civil society relationship, which seems able to marry a ‘small’ but 
effective state with innovative forms of policy making.  As a model, social partnership 
has been used in many other areas of governance and also in structuring internal (or 
managerial) organisational relationships.  As the communications revolution changed 
the way in which government and civil society interacted it also increased the 
capacity of government for joined up policy making and policy review.  So the 
development of social partnership coincided with the development of integrated 
national policy planning and programmes for government, the implementation of 
which was more rigorously monitored that before.  Social Partnership became less of 
a stand-alone policy forum and part of a web of governance that involved multiple 
sets of engagements between government departments and civil society actors, and 
also the production of detailed and interlocking policy.  In this process it could be 
argued that the significance of social partnership was diminished over the years by 
the thickening institutional structure that surrounded it.   In a way the success of the 
diffusion of the social partnership model diminished the significance of the nationally 
negotiated agreements as a forum for policy making. 
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Social partnership has been perceived as part of the successful Irish development 
model (e.g. Hardiman, 2002), although this view has been contested and 
dissatisfaction expressed with the form of development embodied in social 
partnership (e.g. Kirby 2004, 2002).  From the end of the 1990s there has been a 
widespread recognition that social partnership was having difficultly adapting to new 
conditions – a view that has become stronger in the early years of the 21st century.  
Included in this adaptive failure has been the incapacity of social partnership to 
contribute to the development of social policy and to significantly increase social 
inclusion.  As far as anti-poverty policy is concerned, this has been described as the 
application of outmoded solutions to current problems (CORI, 2002).  Social 
partnership appeared to have developed and institutionalised a set of policies as a 
response to the crisis of the 1980s but has not been able to move outside that policy 
framework and develop a policy discourse that explored the issues facing a wealthier 
but in some respects more unequal Ireland (Nolan et al, 2000: 352-3).   
 
Among the most positive claims that have been made for social partnership is that it 
has been a successful ‘small state’ strategy in response to increased ‘globalisation’4 
that has facilitated the Irish state in improving the living standards of the majority of 
its population (e.g. O’Donnell 1995; O’Donnell and O’Reardon 2000).  This is 
significant, as a strong theme of the literature on ‘globalisation’ highlights its negative 
aspects as including an increase in inequality and a tendency to force states down 
the road of a reduced welfare effort as they try to maintain international 
competitiveness (Yeates 2001).  Nolan et. al. (2000: 2) argue that although policy-
making autonomy, as in the case of other small nations active in the international 
economy, is heavily circumscribed, the Irish experience is not a simple story of 
‘globalisation, forced withdrawal of the state and the promotion of neo-liberalism’.  
While liberalisation of markets contributed to Ireland’s success, ‘the state has been 
deeply implicated in the entire process, managing both economic development and 
the welfare state’.  Kirby (2002) on the other hand concludes that the Irish state has 
had a subordinate relationship to global market forces, that this has had an 
‘inegalitarian social impact’ and that the basis for legitimacy of this neo-liberal 
transformation has been ‘fashioned through the agency of social partnership’.   Kirby 
suggests that Ireland’s social partnership arrangements have allowed the state to 
combine international competitiveness with ‘the retention of a minimal welfare net to 
                                                
4 Globalisation for the purposes of this discussion is defined as the impact of the adoption of 
neo-classical macro economic policies and trade liberalisation by the major economic powers 
and the International financial institutions, the impact of which has been enhanced by the 
communications revolution. 
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sustain sufficient consensus’ thereby avoiding damaging social dissent and industrial 
unrest.  In Kirby’s view, not only has the state co-opted those sectors likely to dissent 
from ‘its project of market-led reform’, but furthermore, social partnership can be 
seen as a means of ‘permeating the state and civil society with the logic of the 
market’ (2002 163).  In this regard Murphy (2002: 81) asks if the participation of the 
community pillar is being used as ‘a smoke screen’ within a process that is 
perpetuating inequalities? 
 
Many commentators agree that the period of social partnership has seen a 
‘weakening of welfare effort’ on the part of the Irish state in terms of the percentage 
of national income going on social spending, so that while real increases in the levels 
of social welfare payments were achieved from 1994 overall welfare levels have 
lagged behind (Nolan et al, 2000: 342-5; Callan et.al., 2002).  Government policy has 
also increased inequality - the impact of tax cutting between 1987 and 2001, which 
was central to social partnership, has been regressive, favouring those on higher 
incomes (Nolan et al, 2000: 342-5).  As Hardiman suggests (1998: 122), since l987 
although governments introduced a range of policies designed to tackle social 
inequalities, the effects of these policies were insufficient to make a significant impact 
given the depth of the existing inequalities and the fact that the hardships of fiscal 
adjustments in the 1980s had been far from equally shared and as a result a ‘large 
and indeed growing section of the population was left behind in relative terms’ 
(Hardiman, 1998: 138).  Since 2002 the redistributional impact of government 
budgets has been more progressive (Callan et. a., 2006), however given the existing 
levels of income inequality and continuing wage dispersal the impact of the budgets 
on poverty has been limited. 
  
One of the central tensions that emerged in social partnership in the late 1990s was 
how to deal with the fruits of economic growth. Partnership in times of plenty was 
always presumed to be potentially more difficult than partnership in times of crisis.  
Irish society and the institutions of social partnership are confronted with very 
fundamental issues about the distribution of the fruits of growth (Nolan et al, 2000: 
352-3).  The decline in the welfare effort relative to national income raised 
‘fundamental questions about the quality of social citizenship rights in Ireland into the 
future’ (Nolan et al, 2000: 352).  This situation was not resolved by the presence of 
the community and voluntary pillar in the social partnership negotiations.  The 
Community Platform argued that their concerns had been treated as a ‘residual 
category’ in the partnership talks (CWC, 1997; ADM 2000).  They felt they had little 
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‘clout’ in the negotiations.  Pay and tax issues were sorted out first, leaving issues of 
social inclusion to be dealt with afterwards.    
 
This highlights another issue for social partnership – the extent to which outcomes 
are a negotiated agreement rather than a reflection of government policy and the 
extent to which the community and voluntary sector influence the policy outcomes 
embedded in social partnership.  Hardiman (2000: 303) says that, while the 
participation of the community and voluntary sector has been linked with making 
progress on issues of poverty and inequality, ‘there is little indication that the social 
partnership process is the principal forum within which social policy initiatives are 
actually developed’.  She suggests that insofar as the partnership agreements 
include concessions or promises in specific policy areas, these have already been 
through the conventional governmental policy-planning process.  She quotes some 
examples to supports this and suggests that generally what is involved are ‘uncosted 
declarations of principle’ and that administration and implementation are still decided 
on a ministerial and departmental basis.  So while  ‘the involvement of the community 
sector would purport to bring issues of poverty and social inclusion to the heart of the 
political process, the additional spending committed through this process is marginal, 
compared with departments’ budgets on social policy’.  She maintains that the 
agreements have not fundamentally altered the kind of spending priorities that 
government adopts (2000: 303).   
 
Hardiman (2000: 304) contends that ‘the serious process of policy development on 
issues as central to social partnership as tax policy and social spending are largely 
decided outside the parameters of social partnership’.  She points to the budgetary 
decisions of the second Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition, from 1997 
onwards, to illustrate the limits of consultation.  She suggests that three budgets in a 
row showed erratic priorities, alternately favouring higher and lower paid.  She cites 
the furore caused by Budget 2000, the priorities of which were ‘quite at odds with 
those worked out through the consultative partnership process in NESC and 
endorsed by various independent policy commentators such as the ESRI’.  While 
government did modify some of its tax plans, she suggests ‘that the whole episode 
left many disillusioned with the seriousness of government’s commitment to social 
partnership’.  She points, also, to other far reaching decisions such as the tax 
amnesty of 1993 or the individualisation of taxation, made without any prior 
consultation.  What is striking, she says, is ‘the ease with which governments can 
take decisions on these matters outside the parameters agreed by the process of 
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consensus-oriented consultation – evidently responding more to specific electoral 
priorities than to the consensus-oriented partnership process’ (2000: 305-6).  
 
There appears to be some degree of consensus on aspects of Irish social 
partnership.  Firstly, that it formed part of the state’s policy response to globalisation; 
for most commentators it was a key component of that response.  Secondly, that it 
has from the beginning been a government led process, with the programme for 
government taking precedence and with successive governments pursuing a 
budgetary strategy independent of ‘social partnership’.   Thirdly, that during the 
period of social partnership, notwithstanding the inclusion of the community and 
voluntary pillar, the state’s welfare effort has declined.  This decline is evident in 
growing inequality of income and also inequality of access to essential services such 
as health and housing.  Finally, from the late 1990s it was recognised that ‘social 
partnership’ as a policy response to crisis would have difficulty responding to 
conditions of comparative wealth and economic success.  Always a contested 
process, there was a growing discourse from this period that described social 
partnership as no longer relevant and suffering from institutional fatigue.   
 
 
The policy paradigm contained in the 1987 Agreement 
 
Authors from a wide range of perspectives agree that the policy changes of 1987 
mark a turning point in both the goals of Irish public policy and the policy instruments 
designed to meet those goals.  While an analysis of the reactions of the political 
parties to the crisis is debated in the academic literature, there is a consensus that 
Ireland faced a crisis in the 1980s against which the range of policy solutions 
previously applied by government appeared ineffective5.   This view was shared by 
all the political parties and was a prominent feature of public discourse.  This was 
similar to the situation that existed prior to the election of the Conservative 
government in the UK (as described by Hall).  In Ireland, the economic crisis, and the 
apparent failure of Keynesian economic policy solutions, was a major topic in the 
media and in public discourse.    The election of 1987 was a pivotal event, which with 
hindsight, led to a paradigm shift in Irish public policy, it also proved to be one of the 
most contentious in the history of the state and the one in which voting along class 
lines was the most polarised in modern Irish politics (Laver et al, 1987: 127; Sinnott, 
                                                
5 See Connolly 2006 for an account of the process of regime change in the 1980s. 
http://www.dcu.ie/~cis/publications.htm  
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1995).  It was an election in which all the parties put forward their policy solutions to 
Ireland’s economic crisis.  The policy positions that emerged in the 1987 election for 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael were the product of a period of development and reflection 
and were not a short-term response to the conditions of the election.  In this respect, 
for both the main political parties, they represented their reappraisal of party policy in 
the changed conditions of the 1980s.  Although in some ways both parties drew on 
their political cultural roots, the policies they offered were novel in many respects and 
marked a decisive break with the policy parameters of the 1970s.   Labour and the 
small left parties continued to articulate policies largely within the social democratic 
framework of the 1970s.  
 
The NESC strategy document, A Strategy for Development 1986 – 1990 (NESC, 
1986), published before the election, formed one of the contexts for the negotiation of 
the first social partnership agreement and should be seen as a transitional document 
wider in scope than either the agreement that was based on it or the ideas that 
informed the government’s budgetary policy.  Although the NESC document was the 
starting point of the partnership negotiations; the first budget of the new government 
and contents of the 1987 Social Partnership Agreement ‘Programme for National 
Recovery’ defined the new policy regime.  Following the election of Fianna Fail 
NESC issued the pamphlet ‘A strategy for development 1986-1990: key points’, 
directly addressing the range of political and interest group actors who would have to 
negotiate any emerging form of social concertation.  This document consciously sets 
out to argue for ‘regime change’ in Irish public policy – it sets out the depth of the 
crisis, redefines the problem and suggests a policy solution.  In stark terms it says 
that the ‘seriousness of the economic and social problems facing the country cannot 
be overemphasised’ and that ‘persisting with present policies is not a viable option’ 
(NESC, 1987:4).     
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Table 1: Key elements of the NESC (1986) strategy 
 
Macro Economic Policy: ‘An integrated macro-economic policy the purpose of which is to 
correct the chronic imbalance in the public finances while establishing a better environment 
for the internationally traded sector of the economy‘ 
Tax Reform: ‘Fundamental reform of the tax system’ to ‘enhance efficiency and equity’ 
Social Policy: ‘The progressive removal of major inequities in society’ 
Development Policy: ‘A set of improved long-term development policies in which the state 
intervention would be directed with greater efficiency and effectiveness towards resolving 
structural problems in industry and agriculture’  
 
 
 
The government budget of 1987 that preceded the negotiation of the Programme for 
National Recovery (PNR) introduced severe spending cuts in all government 
departments.  The programme itself promised to maintain the real value of social 
welfare payments and to review health and education policy to ensure they operated 
efficiently.  Employers got public spending cuts and industrial peace; trade unionists 
got a small percentage increase in pay and a commitment to increasing employment.  
They also got a guaranteed role in policy consultation, a favourable situation 
compared to the experience of the trade unions in the UK.  In terms of the way in 
which the new policy ideas were institutionalised, social partnership was a key 
component as it facilitated the government capacity to achieve its key policy 
objectives, principally by ensuring industrial peace and presenting hard policy 
decisions as being the result of a widespread consensus.  In moving towards a form 
of social concertation the government was able to institute neo-liberal economic 
policy solution and a harsh correction of the public finances without either an overall 
parliamentary majority or the backing of an ideologically committed party (Girvin; 
1989).  They were also embracing internationally current new ideas about the 
relationship of civil society to the state and consultative forms of policy making.   
 
In 1987 the PNR was the most public expression of the new policy framework 
adopted by the government.  It contained a commitment to the tight control of public 
finances that took the form of severe spending cuts to reduce indebtedness.   It also 
established international competitiveness as the key goal of policy to ensure growth 
and it defined increasing employment as the major policy tool to reduce poverty.  
Anti-poverty policy itself was presented as a residual policy category in that it was 
subordinate to the needs of macroeconomic policy especially to competitiveness.  
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The long-term effects on anti-poverty policy resulted from the more nuanced aspects 
of the agreement.  As a result of the both the severity of public spending cuts in the 
key social policy areas of health, housing and education and the priority of the 
commitment to control the level of government spending in the future there was a 
narrowing of policy tools to deal with poverty and social exclusion into the longer 
term.  The Agreement also indicated that welfare policy would, as a priority, avoid 
what the document defined as ‘poverty traps’ in the provision of social welfare.  One 
key outcome of this policy during the period of the social partnership agreements is 
that in spite of a frequently expressed concern with the extent of child poverty, the 
social welfare allowance for dependent children has not been increased, reflecting 
the overriding concern that social welfare should not disincentivise social welfare 
recipients with children from accepting low paid employment.  Absolute not relative 
poverty was the key measure used in the Agreement and this subsequently became 
a more significant issue, as the country became wealthier and income inequality 
increased significantly. 
 
The other key aspect of this paradigm was the way in which it was institutionalised.  It 
was, from the beginning, a government led process.  The government budget 
preceded the partnership agreement and set the context for the agreement.  The 
budget also reflected the government’s programme and the commitments it had 
made in the election; it was not a result of negotiations with the social partners.  The 
government where aware that aspects of the budget would make the social partners 
have greater confidence in negotiating with the government, but the budgetary 
process was essentially independent of the partnership process. 
 
In the subsequent agreements, the basic policy ideas that informed the Programme 
for National Recovery have determined the path of anti-poverty policy.  The NESC 
document of 1986 set out four main policy areas that were designed to promote 
‘equality’ and tackle poverty issues; social welfare; housing; health and education.  
While there is some variation in the layout of the subsequent NESC strategy reports 
and the agreements, over the years these policy areas featured in every agreement, 
and although their potential for dealing with poverty has always been acknowledged 
actual policy initiatives have been limited.  The policy content of the Social 
Partnership agreements in these areas is summarised in table 2.  What stands out is 
the extent to which the first partnership agreement provided a framework of ideas 
that subsequently set the agenda of the following agreements.  This is in spite of the 
quite different circumstances that had emerged by the late 1990s and the on going 
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research on poverty (and proposals for policy solutions) that suggested a move 
outside this framework was necessary to achieve anti-poverty goals6. The policy on 
social welfare in the agreements implemented the rationalising reforms suggested by 
the Commission on Social Welfare (1986) but did not move beyond this.  Social 
welfare has remained a safety net against absolute poverty, while the route out of 
poverty, for all categories of claimants, has been defined as moving into employment 
with the goal of avoiding disincentives to work continuing to be a key feature of 
government policy. 
 
The first partnership agreement while it stated a general commitment to reform of the 
health service it did not promise that that reform would include a significant increase 
in funding at any time in the future.  The agreements favoured a managerial 
approach that looked for greater efficiency in service provision for a reduced level of 
public spending, ensuring ‘the most efficient and effective use of the available 
resources’ (PESP 1991).  The agreements contained very little on heath with the 
2000 agreement merely committing the government to implement its national health 
strategy and promising a review of bed capacity but with no new initiatives negotiated 
or signalled.    In 1987 the provision of public housing was not defined as an anti-
poverty policy instrument – the focus of the government was on reducing the cost of 
maintaining the existing stock of public housing.  Even commitments to narrowly 
specified areas of housing need such as homelessness only received a weak 
commitment to unspecified future action.   The role of education in the agreement 
was a dual one of making a contribution to economic development and assisting in 
anti-poverty policy.  It is clearly more central and the policy statements are more 
specific than those on either housing or health.  The PNR recognised the importance 
of education in promoting equity; it committed the government to ensuring that the 
burden of cuts did not fall on the disadvantaged and set an objective of encouraging 
greater participation of disadvantaged people in education.  Subsequent agreements 
did deal with issues of educational disadvantage as well as improving the educations 
system more generally.   
 
After 1996 there is a trend in the NESC reports - which is strengthened with the 
formulation of the developmental welfare state - that widens the definition of ‘welfare’ 
to include the welfare of all those in employment not just the working poor.  This 
includes quality of life issues such as ‘work life balance’.  While it can be argued that 
6 See Combat Poverty website www.cpa.ie. 
Table Two summary of provision on Social Welfare, Housing, Health and Education in Social Partnership Agreements 
Social 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Social Welfare Housing Health Education 
PNR (1987) ? Maintain overall value of 
social welfare payments. 
? Greater % increases for 
lowest payments 
? PRSI for farmers and self 
employed 
? Closer liaison with voluntary 
sector 
? New housing bill will include 
provision for homeless 
? Special emphasis on the 
housing needs of 
disadvantaged groups 
 
? Notes, Commission on 
Health Funding about to 
report 
? Emphasises importance of 
primary care 
? Recognises importance of 
education in promoting 
equity 
? ‘ensure’ burden of cuts does 
not fall on disadvantaged 
? Government will Encourage 
participation of 
disadvantaged 
PESP (1991) ? Implement the 
recommendations of the 
Commission on Social 
Welfare 
? Maintain real value of social 
welfare and where possible 
improve 
? Develop close Government 
links with voluntary 
organisations in this area 
? Focus on low paid via family 
income supplement 
? Will promote owner 
occupation and reduce 
reliance on local authority 
housing 
? Local authorities will 
undertake assessment of 
numbers of homeless 
? Special capital provision of 
£3 million for Travellers 
? Small increase in local 
authority housing support 
? Committed to overhaul 
health service  
administration to increase 
efficiency 
? Adjustment of income limits 
for medical card holders 
? Objective to ensure greatest 
possible equity in availability 
of services 
? Private patients no longer to 
be treated in public wards  
? Committed to maintaining 
private practice 
? Confirms role of education 
in economic development 
? Reduced public teacher 
ratios across system 
? 60 Extra  posts for 
disadvantaged schools 
? Access programmes at 3rd 
level 
PCW (1994) ? Maintain real value and 
make some progress on the 
priority rates as identified by 
the CSW 
? Consideration to the closer 
integration of tax and 
welfare systems 
? Look at issues of incentives 
to work and dependency 
? Low commitment to social 
housing 
? Provisions for homeless 
vague involving funding 
through local authorities and 
voluntary organisations 
? Funding for travellers 
through local authorities 
? Continuation of the 
commitments made in 
PESP 
? Specifics fragmentary 
? National Health Strategy to 
be drawn up 
? Reduction in pupil teacher 
ratios 
? More resources for 
disadvantaged schools 
? Participation at 3rd level 
mentioned but no new 
proposals 
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Agreement Social Welfare Housing Health Education 
Partnership 
2000 (1996) 
? Reform of the family income 
supplement 
? Minimum rates suggested 
by the CSW before the end 
of agreement 
? Consideration of poverty 
and income adequacy 
measures in the context of 
NAPs 
? Child benefit discussed in 
context of integrating tax 
and social welfare and 
poverty traps/disincentives 
to work 
? More participatory estate 
management policies to be 
developed in disadvantaged 
areas (discussed in context 
of urban renewal not 
housing) 
? Programme of physical 
renewal of estates to 
continue 
? Not addressed apart from 
some references to health 
aspects of gender equality. 
? Recognises strong link 
between ed disadvantage 
and social exclusion 
? Will prioritise resources to  
those with greatest needs 
? Promote 3rd level access 
programmes 
? Evaluate early start 
/breaking the cycle schemes 
? Target early school leavers 
PPF (2000) ? Increase real SW rates for 
all 
? Statutory Nat Min Wage 
? Tax relief for low paid 
? Target of €100pw for lowest 
rates 
? Incr. child benefit 
? Relative income poverty to 
be examined 
?  
? Focus on balancing supply 
and demand 
? Planning Bill – 20% set 
aside for social and 
affordable housing 
? Expand local authority 
housing to 22,000 starts 
? Incr. in voluntary housing 
sector 
? Implement national health 
strategy 
? Review of bed capacity 
? Implementation of ‘new deal’ 
report on ed. disadvantage 
? Extra resources for special 
needs 
? New teachers will be 
targeted  at younger classes 
? Improved 3rd level access 
programmes 
? Focus is on mature students 
at 3rd level 
Sustaining 
Progress 
2003 
? Meet target by 2007 for 
lowest welfare rates as set 
out in NAPS  
? Increase social welfare 
pensions to €200pw  by 
2007 (in Programme for 
government) 
? Addressed in special 
provision – affordable 
housing initiative 
? Other statements vague 
? A reference to access to 
primary health care and 
levels of inequalities 
? Committed to equality but 
without any specific 
proposals 
? Targets set to half 
proportion of pupils with 
literacy difficulties by 2006 
and increase senior cycle 
completion to 90% - but no 
new actions listed 
? Nat office for equality of 
access to 3rd level to be 
established  
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 this is understandable in the context of full employment it does have the effect of de-
emphasising those aspects of welfare designed to lift people out of poverty and 
glossing over the extent to which poverty remains a problem.  This further 
‘residualises’ anti-poverty policy, as it, in effect, becomes a residual even within the 
category of welfare. 
 
 
The engagement of the community and voluntary sector 
 
The narrow sector of civil society (the peak economic interest organisations) that the 
government primarily engaged with in the national social partnership negotiations 
was a product of the aims of the first social partnership agreement.  It has not proved 
possible during the period of social partnership to successfully widen out the range of 
civil society organisations involved in social partnership while maintaining the 
integrity of the fundamental aims of the agreements – which have not significantly 
departed from the aims of the initial agreement.  It is clear that from an early stage in 
the development of social partnership the government was caught in a contradiction 
in the process.  This centred on the value that was being placed on consultation and 
engagement with relevant ‘expert’ or ‘active’ civil society organisations and the fact 
that different sectors of civil society had different levels of representative legitimacy 
and also different perspectives on the emerging hegemonic policy paradigm.  A form 
of social partnership that genuinely negotiated social policy with an ad hoc range of 
civil society actors would have also been in conflict with the idea of the policy process 
being government led and reflecting a party political perspective that is embedded in 
the Irish political system and that was also reflected in the first social partnership 
agreement. 
 
With the perceived success of the PNR (1987), and the decision to negotiate another 
partnership agreement, civil society organisations concerned with the alleviation of 
poverty identified the ‘partnership process’ as a key forum for policy development.  
Organisations made written submissions to the government on the anti-poverty 
measures that should be included in a future partnership agreement, and they 
argued that given the wide-ranging nature of the agreements, the negotiations 
themselves should be open to a wider range of actors.  According to the Programme 
for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) agreement submissions from a range of 
groups ‘were fully considered by the relevant Government Departments, discussed 
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with the organisations concerned and considered by the Government in deciding this 
Programme’ (PESP; 1992).  The demand for inclusion in the process by these 
groups intensified after the negotiation of PESP, which was perceived to have a 
strong ‘social policy’ content, or at least it appeared to set the social policy agenda 
for the following three years. Groups argued that it was unreasonable to privilege the 
position of the trade unions and employer’s organisations in this type of negotiation 
given that the outcomes influenced a wide range of people that were not directly 
represented by either of these groups.  The Programme for Competitiveness and 
Work (1994) used the same formula of words as had been used by the PESP when 
describing how the government had deal with pressure group submissions.  Pressure 
group discontent with their exclusion from this major forum of policy development 
was growing, indicated in the Report of the Second Commission on the Status of 
Women, which advocated that the Council for the Status of Women (now the 
National Women’s Council) be given a consultative role in the negotiations on the 
national agreements (1993: 224-225). The government eventually agreed to the 
inclusion of a number of civil society organisations in the negotiation of Partnership 
2000, in spite of continued opposition from both employers and trade unions.  Eight 
organisations from the voluntary and community sector were included in a ‘second 
tier’ of talks, separate from the main substantive negotiations that remained restricted 
to the established social partners.  
 
Prior to the inclusion of the social pillar in social partnership negotiations the 
government had set up the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) in 1993.  In 
setting up the Forum the government may have hoped to deflect the focus of anti-
poverty groups into a parallel channel to the NESC/Social Partnership policy process.  
This channel would deal with anti-poverty policy and other social policy within the 
framework of both the government’s budgetary policy and the national social 
partnership agreements without impinging on the integrity of the negotiation of those 
agreements.  In setting up the NESF the government distinguished its function from 
NESC in a way that went beyond the policy areas of their remit.  While the function of 
NESC was to ‘analyse and report’ to the Taoiseach on ‘strategic issues relating to the 
efficient development of the economy and the achievement of social justice’, the 
mandate of NESF was to ‘monitor and analyse the implementation of specific 
measures and programmes identified in the context of social partnership agreements 
especially those concerned with equality and social inclusion’ (National Action Plan 
against Poverty and Social Exclusion, 2003).  This put the two organisations in an 
essentially hierarchical relationship, with NESC continuing to play the key role in 
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strategic policy formulation while the NESF monitored the effectiveness of the 
implementation of policies agreed within the strategic framework set by NESC.  In 
this way the government may have sought to diffuse demands for wider, or deeper, 
involvement in social partnership by civil society organisations while leaving the 
relationship between NESC and the social partnership agreements – as well as the 
relationship between the key social partners - virtually undisturbed.  Although this 
strategy on the part of government proved to be unsuccessful, ultimately the social 
pillar was not integrated into the social partnership process in a way that made the 
formulation an anti-poverty strategy part of that process. 7  NESC still had the key 
role in strategic policy making in the area of ‘social justice’  - which includes anti-
poverty policy, while the potential for having an impact on anti-poverty policy on the 
part of NESF was weakened by the wide nature of its policy remit, which went 
beyond issues specifically concerned with ‘equality and social inclusion’.  That it was 
not intended when NESF was established that it should act as a source of strategic 
policy ideas in the area of social policy in general and anti-poverty in particular, was 
emphasised by the way in which the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) process 
evolved.  NAPS and its successors were a government led process in which the 
engagement of civil society is fragmented across a government defined agenda of 
multiple sub committees and in which NESF plays a relatively minor role.   
 
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy resulted from the fact that by the mid 1990s many 
countries were experiencing economic growth accompanied by growing inequality 
and the absence of a significant growth in employment resulting in continuing high 
levels of unemployment with its attendant social problems.  This international trend 
resulted in a programme of action to combat poverty and social exclusion agreed at 
the UN World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995.  This 
international initiative was translated into an EU objective which called for member 
states to engage in a co-ordinated process to combat social exclusion.  As a result 
the first National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) of 1997 was endorsed by the 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) Agreement (2000), which also gave 
an undertaking to review the NAPS in consultation with the social partners.  The 
2003 National Action Plan Against Poverty and Social Exclusion places NAPS within 
the social partnership process, stating in its opening section that ‘[t]his National 
Action Plan … is a product of the policies agreed and being developed under social 
                                                
7 In addition to this, by including members of the Oireachtas in NESF the government hoped 
to also dilute the critique of social partnership offered by some Oireachtas members, i.e. that 
it was undemocratic for a key decision making body to bypass the national parliament. 
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partnership’ (2003, 2).   In contrast to this NESF is included in chapter five as part of 
the ‘equality infrastructure’ (2003, 41). 
 
 
The Current Phase of Social Partnership 
 
While the anti-poverty measures in Partnership 2000 had been criticised for their 
vague and aspiration nature, by the time PPF was negotiated criticism had become 
crystallised and more definite measures that addressed poverty directly were being 
demanded.  By this stage in both the central pay bargaining elements and the more 
peripheral ‘social justice’ elements of social partnership there was a sense that 
partnership in its current form could not continue as an effective vehicle for a 
consensual means of policy making.  Post PPF a situation existed where there was 
the potential to abandon or revise social partnership given the changes in Ireland’s 
circumstances and the diverse criticisms being levelled at social partnership.   What 
has emerged in 2006 is a revising of social partnership to a 10 year agreement with 
more frequent national pay agreements in conjunction with what is described as a 
new approach to social welfare and the relationship between economic and social 
policy – the ‘developmental welfare state’.   In addition to this, the relationship of the 
‘voluntary and community’ pillar to the social partnership process has been altered by 
the experience of the negotiations of Sustaining Progress (2003) in a way in which 
underlines the weakness of the model as a form of engagement between 
government and civil society on the issue of anti-poverty policy. 
 
 
The Negotiation of Sustaining Progress 
 
An Investment in Quality: Services, Inclusion and Enterprise (NESC 2003) responded 
to the widespread view that social partnership may not meet the needs of twenty first 
century Ireland advocating a ‘new approach’ to partnership.  Given the difficulties in 
negotiating a social partnership agreement that had emerged by 2003, while the 
document favoured the continuation of social partnership agreements it also pitched 
its policy recommendation to fit a situation in which a social partnership agreement 
proved impossible to negotiate.  The document states that ‘rather than focus on 
partnership’ it wanted to emphasis what policy framework was necessary ‘with or 
without partnership agreement on the current model’ (NESC, 2003: 180).   It 
identifies a consistent policy framework contained in previous NESC strategy 
documents as one in which macroeconomic policy ‘underpins low inflation and 
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steady growth of aggregate output’, while complementary social policies ‘facilitate 
and promote structural change’ in the states welfare system ‘in order to maintain 
competitiveness, eliminate barriers to participation and achieve social cohesion’ 
(NESC, 2003: 171).  The aim of the distributional aspect of the policy is ‘an evolution 
of incomes which ensures continued improvement in competitiveness, which handles 
distributional conflict in a way which does not disrupt the functioning of the economy 
and which is fair’ (NESC, 2003: 171).   
  
The NESC document aims to redefine the content of these three elements in the 
context of the changes that have occurred during the period of social partnership 
(NESC, 2003: 147).  This new approach consists of revising the ‘timescale of social 
partnership’ and moving towards a new relationship between social and economic 
policy embodied in the idea of the developmental welfare state.   The idea of a 
developmental welfare state is fairly underdeveloped in the report, which argues that 
the future development of the economy and society require the ‘developmental and 
welfare dimensions of public policy to be more closely linked’ (2003, 130), and that 
welfare should be seen as supportive to economic development and not as an 
impediment to it.  In spite of the rhetoric the actual policy recommendations of the 
report in the key areas of social welfare, health, housing and education remain firmly 
in the framework provided by the partnership paradigm, and it is also noticeable that 
all of the specific recommendations in the report were existing government policy.   
 
The report in recommending that government move ‘as soon as resources permit 
and earlier than 2007 if possible’ to honour its commitment to bring the lowest level of 
social welfare payment to €150pw continues to make minimum income adequacy it’s 
priority but only in the context of favourable budget conditions.  Also continuing the 
position contained in partnership agreements since 1987 employment is seen as the 
dominant means of alleviating poverty and as ‘a bulwark against social exclusion’ 
(NESC 2003: 347-8).  The report recommends that this ‘perspective’ continue to 
inform Ireland’s practice of ‘activation’, towards employment (2003: 339).   Welfare as 
before is residual and is constrained by the policy priority not to disincentivise people 
moving from welfare to low pay.  The report welcomes ‘substantial increases in Child 
Benefit’ and the degree of ‘horizontal equity’ it provides, which while it is in keeping 
with previous positions on welfare-employment linkages it is in contrast to many 
submissions on this issue prior to the 2003 budget which argued that child benefit 
increases needed to be targeted at those most in need, rather than being paid 
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universally.  The use of dependant child allowance to increase the incomes of 
families dependent on social welfare is not considered. 
 
Housing is addressed in a section headed the ‘Housing Market’. The only significant 
issue addressed is a brief debate on the governments 20% set aside policy outlined 
in the Planning and Development Act.  The focus is on affordable rather than social 
housing and there are no proposals for new policies or a discussion of poverty – 
housing linkages.  There is no dedicated section on health but the Council’s 
observations on NAPS include a recommendation for more specific articulation of 
global targets, such as reducing socio-economic inequalities in health (352).  It 
references ‘authoritative viewpoints’ suggesting that lower socio-economic status is 
the most powerful single contributor to premature morbidity and mortality worldwide.   
Improved levels of education are seen as part of the explanation for Ireland’s 
economic growth in the opening chapter of the report (43) and the requirement of the 
economy and society for a highly education workforce, with ever increasing levels of 
education is set out in the concluding chapter (558).  There is an explicit discussion 
on the linkages between child poverty and educational disadvantage and a strong 
argument for government policy to deal with these linkages.  There is also a 
reference to the need to improve third level access for those currently 
underrepresented there.  There are however no specific recommendations. 
 
Talks began on a new partnership agreement at the end of October 2002. Not only 
did these talks begin in the absence of the NESC report (which was not published 
until March 2003 after the talks had concluded), but a briefing document from NESC 
drawn from the report in progress was not available until a couple of weeks into the 
process of negotiations.8   This supports the view that government policy – rather 
than a strategic view emerging from the government and social partners via NESC – 
is the foundation of the social partnership negotiations.  Serious criticisms of the 
partnership process, doubts about the value of a new agreement and pessimism 
about the ability of the social partners to negotiate an agreement compounded this 
negative beginning.  Previous social partnership negotiations had begun with a 
certain amount of ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and apparently intractable differences 
between the key social partners.  What was different about the circumstances of 
these negotiations is the degree to which the value of the entire process was being 
doubted, including a resurfacing of the criticism that social partnership reduced the 
                                                
8  Irish Times, 31 October 2002. 
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authority of the Dáil and Seanad and was essentially anti-democratic.9   IBEC 
claimed that the social partnership process was ‘suffering from fatigue’ and had lost 
focus.10   
 
The talks also began in economic circumstances that gave the government and IBEC 
some cause for concern.  Although the economy was at virtually full employment, a 
slow down in growth, doubts about the international environment plus inflationary 
pressures in Ireland gave employers and the government leverage to begin the 
crucial pay aspects of the talks from a hard line position.  IBEC predictably placed the 
emphasis on ‘competitiveness’ and argued for pay increases limited to low single 
figures, they also believed that given the circumstance some employers may even 
insist on a pay pause.11  As a result of the government’s stance on the requirements 
of a new agreement, placing the emphasis on maintaining competitiveness, pay 
restraint and controlling public expenditure, SIPTU accused the government of a bias 
towards the business sector, claiming that this had led IBEC to harden their position 
and to call for pay pause.12  Little progress was made in the negotiations in 
November, as the pay element of the talks remained deadlocked; this situation was 
exacerbated by the publication of the public spending estimates in November13 and 
the Budget that followed them in early December.  The Irish Times editorialised that 
the budget had done ‘serious, if not fatal, damage to the prospects of negotiation a 
new partnership agreement’.14  While the employers organisations took a positive 
view of the budget seeing it as a ‘serious attempt’ to get public finances under 
control, David Begg (general secretary ICTU) viewed the budget in an essentially 
negative light stating it had done ‘nothing to create a fairer society’.  He went on to 
say however that it contained no ‘structural impediment’ to a new agreement, but it 
had ‘not made the talks environment any easier’.15  Groups in the voluntary and 
community pillar also expressed the view that the budget had made a deal harder to 
achieve and had ‘undermined confidence’ in the partnership process as the 
government had ‘reneged on commitments to tackle poverty and social exclusion’.16  
The Simon Communities commented that before the government had outlined what 
they were prepared to include in the new deal on social exclusion the budget had 
                                                
9  Richard Bruton, Fine Gael reported in The Irish Times, 31 October 2002. 
10  Irish Times, 31 October 2002. 
11  Irish Times, 31 October 2002. 
12  SIPTU President Jack O’Connor, Irish Times 2 November 2002. 
13  Irish Times, 19 November 2002 
14 Irish Times, 7 December 2002. 
15  Irish Times, 5 December 2002. 
16 Irish Times, 10 December 2002 
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‘already ensured that the outstanding commitments from the previous agreement 
would not be delivered’17. 
 
Although the ICTU was critical of the government’s budgetary policy it also appeared 
keen to maintain social partnership, in spite of the fact that by the middle of 
December the talks on the pay elements of the deal appeared to be on the point of 
break down. At this point David Begg, in response to the criticism that had been 
levelled at the budget, argued in favour of the ‘social value of consensus deals’ with 
the potential to transform Ireland into ‘a modern social democracy’, which would have 
a ‘capacity to give equal importance to economic efficiency and social justice’.  He 
went on to say that there had to be a ‘broad consensus … embracing the political 
realm and civil society’; however he stresses that ‘at the end of the day it is the 
government that calls the shots’.  He argued that ‘the partnership process is, always 
has been and always should be subordinate to the political process’ and that the 
essential value of social partnership is that it engages civil society in the process of 
governance.18 
 
In response to these difficulties the Taoiseach stated in mid December that he would 
not intervene to save talks, although he was committed to the social partnership 
process,19 but by the beginning of January he was expressing a fear that a ‘free’ for 
all in pay bargaining could damage Ireland’s competitiveness.20   After a dramatically 
staged intervention by the government in mid January both ICTU and IBEC 
welcomed the initiative and responded positively ‘in general terms’.21  Following this 
successful intervention the Taoiseach wrote to representatives of the community and 
voluntary sectors informing them that a three-year agreement was still envisaged, in 
spite of the proposed 18-month pay deal.  It is only at this stage that the social and 
community pillar really become involved in the negotiations with the government on 
Social Partnership.  The Community and Voluntary sector expressed their 
disappointment with government proposals, claiming that a document presented by 
officials was little more than a restatement of existing commitments and was short on 
specific proposals.   They were also concerned that even the commitments in the 
document were contingent on sufficient resources being available.22  From the outset 
                                                
17 Simon News 5.  www.simon.ie  
18  Irish Times, 16 December 2002. 
19  Irish Times, 19 December 2002. 
20  Irish Times, 6  January 2003. 
21 Irish Times, 14 January 2003. 
22  Irish Times 23 January 2003. 
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of the negotiations the members of the ‘social pillar’ were told by government officials 
that no additional resources for social inclusion would be offered as part of the 
negotiations, and there was no real opportunity to engage with the government 
departments or to negotiate the inclusion of ‘any specific commitments’23.  By the 
beginning of February after the circulation of a revised document by the government 
an agreement was still ‘in the balance’.  The lack of specifics put community group 
support for the agreement in doubt but there was no indication at this stage that 
groups were ready to leave the talks, although Community Platform was ‘extremely 
pessimistic’ as the agreement offered no specific commitments on social inclusion 
and CORI described the agreement as modest at best and that the government has 
put no resources on the table.24    
 
Employers and trade unions, with evidence of internal division, ratified the agreement 
by the end of March.  In the period between the negotiation of the agreement and its 
ratification by the ICTU and IBEC, the community and voluntary sector went through 
a period of debate as its constituent groups decided whether or not to endorse the 
deal, which was generally recognized to contain very little in terms of measures to 
alleviate poverty.   The Society of Vincent de Paul accused the Government of 
‘dismantling social partnership’ as they argued that Sustaining Progress was ‘nothing 
more than a pay deal’ and that there had been no ‘meaningful negotiation with the 
community and voluntary sector.  In their view the agreement carried no benefits for 
the poor and disadvantaged and the government had fudged the key issues in 
housing, social welfare, education and health, making a fundamental choice not to 
make resources available for the necessary social inclusion measures or to 
addressed the reality of poverty.25 The Society of Vincent de Paul and Cori decided 
in spite of their reservations about the agreement to remain on the inside.  As did the 
Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU), which voted for ‘qualified 
acceptance’ of Sustaining Progress while being critical of the lack of ‘clear specific 
actions’.26  Other groups including the Community Platform, the National Women’s 
Council, and Simon decided to reject the agreement. 
 
                                                
23 Community Workers Co-operative, report on ‘Sustaining Progress’, page 1, 
www.cwc.ie/news/art03/sustain.html
Simon News 5, www.simon.ie  
24  Irish Times, 3 February 2003. 
25  Irish Times, 12 February 2003. 
26  Irish Times, 14 March 2003. 
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In the face of the discontent with the agreement in the community and voluntary pillar 
the Taoiseach sent what was described as a ‘blunt message’ to organizations 
thinking of ‘walking away’.  He promised high level policy engagement with those 
who stayed inside, while those who did not endorse the agreement, by implication 
would not enjoy this level of engagement.27  Subsequently those voluntary groups 
who did not endorse the agreement such as Simon, National Traveller Movement, 
NWCI & Community Workers’ Co-op claimed that they are being excluded from 
discussion on future social policy. Sean O’Regan, secretary to the Community 
Platform, said ‘no one in the group was happy with the agreement and we decided as 
a group there was nothing in it to endorse for the groups we represent’.  Noeleen 
Hartigan, policy officer with the Simon Communities of Ireland, said Simon could not 
ratify Sustaining Progress as it offered no meaningful solutions to tackling 
homelessness and poverty, the unanimous decision of the organisation was that in 
spite of being unable to endorse Sustaining Progress Simon was committed to the 
social partnership process.  They were disappointed at the government’s decision to 
reorganise the Community and Voluntary Pillar excluding Simon, saying that ‘Social 
Partnership is now only open to those who will fully endorse the government’s 
position’28.  At that time it appeared that Simon would be excluded from the review of 
the National Homeless Strategy.  The NWCI, also did not ratify the agreement 
because it did ‘not in any way progress equality for women’ as a result the 
organisation was excluded from a number of different policy areas.29
 
Groups from the ‘voluntary and community’ pillar were also critical of the way in 
which the negotiations were conducted from their perspective – which marked a 
change in the way in which previous negotiations had taken place.  There was very 
little real negotiation.  Government departments were not allowed to engage in 
bilateral meetings with members of the pillar, their main form of engagement was 
through plenary meeting or bilaterals with the government where only the 
Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Finance spoke from the 
government side and ‘[O]nly on the last day was there very limited contact with 
officials from some departments around relatively minor textual changes’30.  This 
contrast with the pillars view of previous partnership negotiations, the NWCI 
described the PPF negotiations as distinguished by the cohesiveness of the 
                                                
27  Irish Times, 24 February 2003 
28 Simon News 6, June 2003.  www.simon.ie  
29  Report by Kitty Holland, Irish Times, 23 June 2003. 
30 Community Workers Co-operative, report on ‘Sustaining Progress’, page 1, 
www.cwc.ie/news/art03/sustain.html
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Community and Voluntary Pillar in the face of what they described as the ‘economic 
consensus’ and felt that they had made some progress.  They however also noted 
‘deepening the social partnership process beyond traditional objectives represents a 
significant challenge to the other social partners and the Government.  In negotiation 
the agreement a clear conflict emerges between the power of social partnership to 
direct social policy and the limits, which Government sets on the process’31. 
 
One of the key features of the negotiation of Sustaining Progress is the attachment to 
social partnership displayed by the government both in the face of mounting criticism 
of social partnership and in the demonstrably weakened nature of the process itself.  
This later point includes the reduction in clarity of the relationship to the 2003 NESC 
report, the weakening support for the form of pay deal that social partnership 
embodies and the discontent in the voluntary and community pillar.  The IFA (Irish 
Farmers Organisation) endorsement of the agreement was grudging and even 
securing that required the intervention of the Taoiseach.  The organisation referred to 
the agreement as a ‘public sector pay bill’32 and others have commented on the 
government’s interest in social partnership as a means of regulating public sector 
pay.  Here it is argued that the government’s interest in maintaining social 
partnership is broader and more fundamental than seeing it as a means of 
negotiating pay agreements with public sector unions, although that may be a factor.  
Social Partnership was conceived as a way of building social consensus around a set 
of policy measures at a time of crisis.  The idea of a consensual (or at least 
consultative) process of policy making within the framework of policies set out in the 
first partnership agreement still underpins government thinking – and the government 
appears to be unwilling to envisage a different path.  This is reinforced by a strong 
discourse that social partnership has played a key role in Ireland’s economic growth.  
Tánaiste Mary Harney argued ‘Working together through partnership has delivered.  
It has been a major contributor to the tremendous social and economic successes we 
have all been party to in recent years.  It has also enabled us to respond flexibly to 
opportunities and the threats of the global market place’33.  In the government’s 
discourse there is a strong thread that links social partnership to a particular set of 
policies and the belief that only a narrow range of policies are possible if economic 
growth is to be maintained.  There appears to be a fear that abandoning social 
partnership will produce a situation of uncertainty where all policies are up for 
                                                
31 www.NWCI.ie National Women’s Council of Ireland, Opinion – PPF, Orla O’Connor Policy 
Analyst (NWCI Negotiator at Talks) 
32  Irish Times, 3 February 2003. 
33 Speech by An Tánaiste Mary Harney at the last plenary meeting of PPF (July 2003) 
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reconsideration.  Abandoning one key aspect of the existing edifice of public policy 
will threaten the entire structure.  Taoiseach Bertie Ahern warned of the ‘dangers of 
policy errors’  and expressed the fear that ‘if we react in the wrong way, the 
consequences will be immediate and severe … as those who can remember the pre-
partnership era know only too well, policy errors will be punished severely ‘34. 
 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the NESC strategy report regarding a ‘developmental 
welfare state’ the Agreement mirrored the lack of policy recommendations beyond 
existing government policy contained in the report  – making the frustration of 
elements of the voluntary and community pillar with the process understandable.  In 
the agreement Sustaining Progress (2003) social welfare is not treated as a separate 
section the references that exist are in the chapter 5, ‘Delivering a Fair and Inclusive 
Society’.  The NAPS had suggested new rates for the lowest welfare payments and 
the agreement gave a commitment to meet them by 2007.   It also reiterated a 
commitment found in the Programme for Government that social welfare pensions 
would be increased over a 5-10 year period to 34% of average industrial earnings, 
reaching a target level of €200 by 2007 (2003: 57).  Economic inclusion is once again 
based on employment and welfare is specifically identified as having the objective of 
being sufficient to sustain dignity and avoid poverty while facilitating employment.  
Although the Agreement made a general commitment to equality of access to health 
care resources it contained no action plans to achieve this.  In response to the 
continuing rapid increases in house prices the Agreement included a special housing 
initiative focused on the impact of housing costs on the living standards of those in 
work.   While this ‘special initiative’ set an objective of increasing the supply of 
affordable housing by 10,000 units, the focus of the document, more generally, is on 
increasing housing supply in the hope that it will reduce price pressures.  However 
the rest of the document contains no significant statements on social housing.  The 
government simply commits to make the best use of available resources.  There are 
no new measures on social housing and no linking of housing and poverty.  In 
education although there are some aspirational targets there are also no new policy 
initiatives.  
 
By 2003 it seemed clear that although social partnership contained strongly 
institutionalised ideas about both the form anti-poverty policy should take and its 
                                                
34 An Taoiseach’s remarks at the opening of the National Economic and Social Development 
Office (NESDO), 24 February, 2003. 
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relationship to the state’s other policy priorities, it was not a place where such policy 
was formulated and discussed.   The over arching policy ideas that informed social 
partnership also appeared to some to constitute a straightjacket on policy reform with 
any increased social welfare effort effectively defined as anti-competitive in this 
paradigm.  As a result, voices within NESC looked to develop a policy formulation 
that could build a positive relationship between increased social spending and the 
international competitive position of the Irish state35 the beginning of which was the 
idea of the developmental welfare state discussed in the NESC report of 2003.  
 
 
The Developmental Welfare State 
 
NESC elaborated the new relationship between economic and social policy to which 
the report had referred in The Developmental Welfare State (NESC 2005).  The 
document brings back in the issue of the role of a wide range of social spending on 
poverty arguing that access ‘to services – in health, education, housing and other 
areas – is also integral to social protection and, in some instances, more important to 
securing people’s living standards and participation in society than having a higher 
money income’ (Executive Summary: xiv).  The ‘Developmental Welfare State’ 
(DWS) described in this document has three interlinked aspects; services, incomes 
and activist measures, but it regards the development of services as ‘the single most 
important route to developing social protection’ (executive summary, xix).  This is in 
contrast to the acknowledged reduction in spending on the provision of key services 
such as health, housing and education during the period of the previous six social 
partnership agreements.  This under funding is acknowledged in the executive 
summary of The Developmental Welfare State (2005) on page xvi.  The list of 
‘services’ that are included in the DWS is wide, as well as the three key ones listed 
above it also includes a number that are related to the quality of life of those in 
employment, to the population in general and some that could also be seen as 
services that could facilitate individuals with caring responsibilities enter the 
workforce; they include childcare, care of the elderly, transport and employment 
services (executive summary, xvii).  In the provision of these services the primary 
role of the government is identified as being to act as ‘regulator and guarantor’ of 
services that are provided by a diverse range of actors in the non-profit and 
commercial sectors.  Arguing that ‘social protection that is paid for by the state does 
                                                
35 Conversation with member of NESC from this period. 
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not have to be provided by the state’, the identification of ‘the appropriate scale and 
nature of direct public service provision’ is described as a ‘subordinate challenge’ 
(Executive Summary, xiv).   It is envisaged that the majority of the population will use 
the same set of services.  Mainstream providers will be required to adopt a ‘tailored 
universalism’ approach to accommodate a ‘more diverse public, including people 
who are socially disadvantaged’ (Executive Summary, xiv).    
 
The three categories of needs in terms of income that are identified are child poverty; 
people of working age; and those on pensions.  For those of working age social 
welfare with ‘cover basic needs’ for long-term social welfare recipients, while 
‘supplements and services’ will encourage these individuals to move into paid 
employment.  The DWS clarifies the emphasis of the previous NESC strategy 
documents on the role of employment in ending social exclusion when it spells out 
‘society’s expectation’ that people of working age is that they will participate in 
economic activity and its belief that ‘only in rare cases does an individual have no 
capacity to develop a greater degree of self-reliance’ and therefore seen to be 
dependent on some form of income supplement (Executive Summary: xxiii).  The 
document reiterates the government’s commitment to the provision of state pensions 
accepting ‘that the basic state pension has to be the major bulwark for keeping 
retired people from being at-risk-of poverty and that access to it, or its equivalent, has 
effectively to be open to every person in retirement’  (Executive Summary: xx).  The 
DWS retains a commitment to the idea of universalism in the provision of child 
support but it is also advocated that a progressive element is introduced so that 
some children ‘are supported more than others’ (Executive Summary: xx).   
 
The activist measure contained in the document appears to be support for the 
engagement of local actors – the community and voluntary, public and private 
sectors - in achieving the goals of the DWS.   It seems to offer funding security for 
such groups who can meet agreed performance targets forming a ‘network of diverse 
and autonomous service providers’ (Executive summary; xx and xxii).  This will 
require that ‘statutory service providers’ ‘reconfigure their own budgets and models of 
delivery to accommodate these changes (Executive Summary: xxi).  However the 
exact form these potential changes should take are not spelt out. 
 
Do these new proposals amount to a paradigm change, particularly when taken in 
conjunction with the perception by actors from the ‘voluntary and community’ pillar 
that the negotiation of the 2003 partnership had marked a significant change in the 
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way in which the agreements were negotiated36 and the 10 year timeframe of the 
2006 agreement?  After the negotiation of Sustaining Progress the idea of a 
developmental welfare state did not appear to have any impact on the wider policy 
community; it did not feature on the websites of engaged civil society organizations 
and neither is it mentioned in any Oireachtas reports37.  This position changed to 
some extent with the publication of the Developmental Welfare State (NESC, 2005) 
and perhaps more significantly the appointment of an active minister, with a definite 
political agenda, into the Department of Social and Family Affairs.  Following the 
publication of the NESC report on the developmental welfare state where was some 
limited coverage of its contents, however it was the appointment of Seamus Brennan 
as Minister and his proposed reforms38 that produced a greater awareness of the 
concept of the developmental welfare state. 
 
The social welfare system has been subject to some reform and rationalization, but 
the extent of this reform is consistent with Hall’s first and second order changes in a 
policy regime, within the framework established by the first social partnership 
agreement.  Even the radical sounding developmental welfare state is a further 
rationalization of these trends, encompassing the wider social policy trends in the 
provision of health services, housing and education.  While the Developmental 
Welfare State further intensifies the idea that all adults of working age, irrespective of 
their special circumstances, should be employed and not dependent on social 
welfare, it also restructures the headings under which the range of social policy is 
discussed.  This restructuring, focusing as it does on the individuals lifecycle, has the 
effect of de-emphasizing social policy areas such as health, housing and education 
as anti-poverty tools, because   the discussion on these policy areas is fragmented 
between the separate sections dealing with children, people of working age, and 
people of retirement age.  To the extent that these policy areas were relatively 
weakly represented in the partnership process this change merely serves to both 
consolidate the existing position and the mask the continued weaknesses in 
government policy in these areas.    
                                                
36 For the views of the Community Workers Co-op see  www.cwc.ie/new/art03/sustain.html  
37 Results of a survey of websites and Dail reports conducted in 2004. 
38 See Dept website http://www.welfare.ie/  
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Towards 2016 
 
The negotiation of the 2006 agreement like its predecessor was problematic, drawn 
out and accompanied by a discourse on ‘life without partnership’39.  In spite of this it 
was clear that the key players were ‘determined to conclude an agreement if 
possible’40 and that the government saw social partnership as a ‘winning formula’41.  
IBEC was also strong in its commitment to partnership; although ‘not an end in itself’ 
it was a proven successful model ‘that was the envy of the developed world’42.  It 
was also observed in the media that the government wanted a social partnership 
deal the would take them through ‘a tough general election campaign’43  The 
agreement was for 10 years with annual reviews, however the pay deal component 
was only for 27 months.  The agreement document entitled Towards 2016 – 10 year 
framework Social Partnership Agreement, is very long and detailed, covering a wide 
range of policy issues from road safety to foreign policy that amounts to a reiteration 
of current government policy in all departments rather than a negotiated agreement.   
While the document with a degree of understatement says that while ‘not all policy 
issues covered … are necessarily agreed with the social partners’ they provide a 
‘reference for the engagement in the relevant areas’ (Towards 2016, 68).  On the role 
of social partnership in policy development the document emphasizes that the 
‘Government has ultimate responsibility for decision making within the framework of 
democratic accountability’ (Towards 2016, 68).   
 
The press coverage of the negotiations and of the final deal emphasizes the 
peripheral nature of the engagement of the voluntary and social pillar, and the lack of 
real negotiations in this area44.  It is also noticeable compared to the commentary on 
the finalizing of Sustaining Progress there was little debate around the implications 
for poverty issues of the agreement.  Civil society organizations working in this area 
are no longer engaged with the social partnership process to the extent that would 
                                                
39 For example see Vincent Browne writing that a ‘collapse of social partnership would be no 
bad thing’, Irish Times, May 31, 2006, ‘Social Partnering is nonsense’. 
40 Irish Times, May 30 2006, front page ‘Taoiseach warns time is running out on pay deal 
talks’. 
41 Irish Times, May 27 2006, quoting Taoiseach speaking at the Impact Conference, page 5. 
42 Turlough O’Sullivan, Director General IBEC, writing in the Irish Times December 16 2006, 
page 16. 
43 Irish Independent, June 1 2006, Editorial 
44 Irish Independent, June 1 2006, Editorial. 
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have been the case previously45.  The 2006 Agreement reaffirms the trends in anti-
poverty policy since 1987.  Employment is promoted as the primary vehicle for 
removing people from poverty.  Welfare is a safely net to meet basic needs, it is not 
intended by government to address issues of inequality in society, and there is a 
deep seated disinclination to include any significant anti-poverty measures in 
education, health or housing policy.  On balance, although Towards 2016 contains a 
certain amount of repackaging it does not contain a redirection of policy when 
compared to previous social partnership agreements – it would be more accurate to 
call it a deepening and a clarification of existing policy paths.  Nor does it seem that 
social partnership negotiations are now of significance to a range of groups active on 
anti-poverty issues, the policy activity of such groups focuses on specific aspects of 
the government system and their own networking.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Irish social partnership process began in 1987 as an open-ended compromise in 
which the participants did not have to alter their long term policy objectives or their 
social and political analysis.  In effect, it was a ‘process’, the end result of which was 
not predetermined at the outset.  Although social partnership began as a policy 
solution to a situation of crisis, the key ideas on which the process was based 
became institutionalised and the number of possible policy paths was subsequently 
narrowed.  This set of institutionalised ideas now shapes government policy including 
the 2006 Agreement.  In effect, what was a short-term strategic consensus is now 
described by NESC (2003) as a ‘common view’, notwithstanding the contested 
nature of social partnership. In terms of poverty policy the ‘common view’ described 
by NESC is contained in the ‘developmental welfare state’ serving the needs of 
economic growth and international competitiveness.   Welfare policy is a residual 
policy category and the parameters of welfare policy are conditioned by, and must 
serve economic ends.   
 
                                                
45 A survey of websites of groups who were both current and former member of the voluntary 
and community pillar in the aftermath of the conclusion of the negotiations of ‘Towards 2016’ 
even those groups who were currently engaged in the social partnership negotiations did not 
have any substantial commentary on the agreement.   A reading of the websites (with the 
possible exception of Cori that contains a commentary on and links to former agreements) 
indicates that social partnership has become increasingly insignificant as a space for policy 
engagement to these groups.  Pre-budget submissions and engagement with relevant 
government departments has remained significant for campaigning groups 
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While in the early years of social partnership, the agreements and the NESC strategy 
papers that preceded them, were a central and publicly visible forum for policy 
making, the exclusive significance of social partnership has diminished.  This 
reduction in the policy significance of social partnership has resulted from both the 
institutionalisation of multiple consultative fora on a range of policy issues that draw 
on the partnership model and the fact that economic success has made achieving 
policy consensus with the social partners less pressing.  Related to the issue of the 
importance of social partnership in the policy process overall is the issue of the way 
in which anti-poverty policy was institutionalised within social partnership.  This 
question has two aspects - firstly, the place that anti-poverty policy occupies in the 
policy paradigm reflected in the social partnership process and secondly, the 
capacity of social partnership, as a dynamic negotiated process, to have an impact 
on the government’s anti-poverty policy.  In this regard the place of anti-poverty 
policy over this period is clearly that of a residual policy category, shaped primarily by 
the needs of macroeconomic policy.  The engagement of pro-poor actors in the 
negotiation process had no significant impact.  The community and voluntary sector 
could claim that they gained some marginal concessions in the early years of their 
involvement, but the negotiation of the last two agreements have shown no indication 
of any substantive negotiations on anti-poverty policy.  In as much as the agreements 
reflect government policy there is no evidence of a shift away from the orthodoxy of 
the ‘ideas’ that have underpinned government policy for nearly two decades.  
Although the budgets since 2002 have reversed the trend of previous budgets and 
have been slightly progressive in their impact, this has reflected the concerns of 
Fianna Fáil to maintain electoral support and there is no evidence that this was linked 
to the social partnership process.  Social partnership has from its inception been a 
government led process.  The government budgetary process is separate from the 
partnership process and it is the budget that has primacy.  The budgetary process 
has provided the framework for social partnership; it has not reflected the negotiated 
agreements.  This dominance by government in the process is exemplified by the 
2006 Agreement which is a detailed re-statement of government policy and which 
does not even claim to be a negotiated document. 
 
This paper argues that social partnership as it exists today is based on the policy 
paradigm substantially established by the first social partnership agreement which 
institutionalised the ideational framework that determined the way in which economic 
and social policy was subsequently considered.  The strength of using an ideational 
framework is not in its capacity to predict when paradigmatic shifts in policy will take 
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place, but in its ability to explain both how such shifts occur and the power of 
institutionalised ideas to frame subsequent policy discourse.  It also points to the 
difficulty of achieving substantial policy reform without addressing directly the 
fundamental ideas on which a policy regime is based.  The strongly institutionalised 
policy frame evident in the social partnership process has proven to be a barrier to 
developing anti-poverty policy beyond the parameters laid down in the early 
agreements.  The implication of the analysis in this paper is that incremental change 
will not significantly alter the place of anti poverty policy within Irish public policy and 
it will require a reworking of the fundamental ideas that underpin this institutionally 
embedded policy regime to produce an effective response to the poverty and 
inequality in Irish society.   
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